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Corporations are people, my friend . . . . Of course they are. Everything
corporations earn ultimately goes to the people. Where do you think it
goes? Whose pockets? Whose pockets? People’s pockets. Human beings,
my friend. [Mitt Romney, cited in Stein and Siegel, 2011]
Corporations are treated as fictional persons for legal purposes in the United States
and many other countries. The doctrine of corporate personhood permits corporations
to make and enforce contracts on behalf of their investors.1 Legal personhood also
limits the liability of shareholders and officers, protections known as the “corporate
veil.” As jural persons, corporations do not have the same rights as natural persons
or citizens, distinctions that have recently been addressed in a series of important
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the most famous of these cases, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
(558 U.S. [2010]), the Supreme Court ruled that corporations have a First Amendment
right to free speech, including the right to make unlimited political contributions. The
2010 decision has been widely criticized for making it easier for corporations to
influence elections. It also incited a political movement that challenges the special
privileges associated with corporate personhood, including activists who stamped
dollar bills with the slogan: “Corporations are not people. Money is not free speech.
Amend the Constitution.” The decision in Federal Communications Commission v.
AT&T (562 U.S. [2011]) went the other way, with the Supreme Court ruling that
corporations do not have a right to personal privacy that protects them against the
disclosure of federal records. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. (573 U.S. [2014]) that corporations have the right to religious
freedom. Consequently, they cannot be compelled to pay for federally mandated
health insurance that includes coverage for birth control. The decision has become a
flash point for reproductive politics, as well as continuing debates about the nature
of corporate personhood.
The inconsistency in these rulings—that corporations have the right to free speech
and religion, like natural persons, but lack a corresponding right to privacy—suggests
that these decisions are being made on a case-by-case basis rather than uniformly ap-
plying an established definition of corporate personhood. The metaphor of corporate
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personhood allows the courts to treat corporations as legal “persons in some respects
and as nonpersons for other purposes” (Berger 2004:181).2
The metaphor of corporate personhood also extends beyond its legal interpolation.
Like all metaphors, the comparison between corporations and persons influences
how we think about both terms. It suggests that corporations are similar to people
in some ways and consequently share some of their capabilities and habits. This
helps to explain the attribution of human characteristics and motives to corporations,
including references to corporations as benevolent, greedy, caring, or irresponsible.
Corporations are also personified in the form of their charismatic founders or chief
executive officers, whose behavioral traits may be regarded as iconic assets (Bose
2010; Isaacson 2011; Rajak 2014). Corporations increasingly promote themselves us-
ing the virtuous language of responsibility, sustainability, and transparency, although
their critics invoke the same vocabulary in pointing out their shortcomings (Kirsch
2014; Rajak 2011a, 2011b; Shever 2012; Welker 2014). Both corporations and their
critics mobilize the metaphor of corporate personhood.
The articles in this symposium examine how the metaphor of corporate personhood
is used in nonlegal contexts. They suggest that analysis of the metaphor and its uses
provides valuable insight into contemporary debates about capitalism. On the one
hand, references to corporate personhood can be a means of embedding accountability
within an otherwise diffuse organization. Such references are not so much a category
error as a means of addressing corporate responsibilities and, therefore, a potential
starting point for critique rather than the misapprehension of a legal metaphor.3 On
the other hand, corporations invoke the metaphor of corporate personhood to extend
their power and influence. Given the wide range of contexts in which the metaphor
is invoked, anthropological attention to corporate personhood is relevant to a number
of important political and economic debates.
Recent attention to corporate personhood is closely related to the growing significance
of branding in contemporary capitalism (Foster 2007; Manning 2010). Branding no
longer focuses primarily on the relationship between consumers and commodities,
but increasingly addresses the relationship between corporations and shareholders
(Bashkow 2008; Foster 2008; Welker and Wood 2011). In the era of shareholder cap-
italism, corporate reputations have become a valuable asset. Shareholder capitalism
is associated with greater participation in the stock market by individual investors,
which has been spurred by the dismantling and privatization of public pensions and
corporate retirement plans, as well as threats to entitlement programs (Welker and
Wood 2011:S59). These trends push individuals to participate in the stock market
despite widespread recognition of corruption and bias against small investors. They
have also fueled social choice and green investment funds, as well as other forms of
shareholder politics (Foster 2008). Corporations are thus increasingly concerned with
managing their brands even when they do not produce commodities sold directly to
consumers.
The metaphor of corporate personhood has also come to affect how we think about
ourselves. One example of the transference is the way individuals and corporate
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managers are seen as appropriate subjects for similar technologies of reform in self-
help books and manuals for improving managerial skills, both perennial best sellers.
The American “rhetoric of self-making” (Battaglia 1995) is increasingly inflected by
business metaphors, especially the image of the ideal individual as an independent
entrepreneur. In particular, participation in the job market promotes a view of the
individual as a branded, corporate self (Gershon 2014). An example of how this
metaphor is deployed in political rhetoric is the former U.S. vice presidential candi-
date Paul Ryan’s argument that individuals should be freed from their unproductive
dependence on government entitlements so they can participate more fully in the
economy. Here individuals are seen as independent entities for whom anything short
of complete autonomy is regarded as counterproductive.
Alternatively, one might ask whether other models of the person might be better suited
to the metaphor of corporate personhood than the Euro-American view of the self
as a “bounded, unique, more or less integrated . . . [and] distinctive whole” (Geertz
1983:59). For instance, what would be the implications of thinking about the person
as the sum of many relationships (Wagner 1991)? The view that some corporations
or banks are “too big to fail” because they are essential to the economy might be seen
as an example of a relational perspective on corporate personhood (Riles 2011).4
In contrast, Mitt Romney’s assertion that we should have let the automobile industry
in Detroit go bankrupt rather than use federal funds to bail them out represents an
alternative perspective. His private equity firm Bain Capital engaged in a form of
predatory capitalism that dismantles corporations and sells off their most valuable
assets, leaving stripped down, highly leveraged companies that often struggle to stay
in business. Although destructive forms of capitalism are justified with reference
to the impartial efficiency of the free market, private equity firms like Bain Capital
minimize their risks through the sale of corporate assets and by ensuring that the
reorganized companies pay their fees before meeting the demands of other creditors.
Romney’s view of corporations mirrors his perspective on individuals, especially
[The] forty-seven percent . . . who are dependent upon the government,
who believe that they are victims, who believe the government has a
responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are entitled to
health care, to food, to housing, you-name-it. That, that’s an entitlement.
And the government should give it to them. [Corn 2012]
The argument that both persons and corporations should operate independently in the
marketplace contradicts a relational model of personhood.
Another possibility is a performative model of personhood in which corporations
and individuals adopt roles appropriate to the context. This might help explain the
contradiction between Romney’s attempt to position himself as a political centrist in
the final days of his presidential campaign and the remarks he made about the “forty-
seven percent” to a group of wealthy donors. A performative model of corporate
personhood could similarly help explain the contradictions between the virtuous
language of corporate social responsibility and the negative outcomes of “actually
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existing capitalism” (Benson and Kirsch 2010:64). Yet corporations steadfastly assert
that their policy statements accurately represent their core values, even as they fight
against regulatory efforts to achieve the same goals. A performative approach to
corporate personhood could help reveal the ways corporations do and say things
that are incompatible or even contradictory, much like individuals. To some extent,
this might be the consequence of how corporations are composed of individuals
who possess their own views, although it can also be seen as an intentional strategy
to manage their public reputations while simultaneously protecting their economic
bottom line.
It is also possible to invoke the language of actor network theory in the identification
of the corporation as an actor with agentive capabilities that persist through time
and have significant effects in the world (Law and Hassard 1999). But actor network
theory tends to leave important questions about power unanswered. What does it
mean, for example, to attribute intentionality to a corporation in contrast to disaggre-
gating the perspectives of those persons who direct and contribute to its operation?
Should the focus be on the attitudes and opinions of the individuals employed by
the corporation, or on the consequences of actions undertaken by the corporation?
It is not simply that good intentions are insufficient, or that persons who work for
corporations sell their labor under conditions of constraint. Rather, the disciplining
of individual differences to ensure that employees do not compromise profitability
is standard operating procedure for the corporation. Another analytic option would
be to recognize that corporations are assemblages of persons and things (Ong and
Collier 2005), although this approach also makes it difficult to hold corporations
accountable for their social and environmental impacts.
Taking the metaphor of corporate personhood seriously entails consideration of how
it enters contemporary political debates about corporations and capitalism, rather than
limiting our attention to its application within legal domains. Given that metaphors are
always partial, it is important to ask what is neglected or obscured when corporations
are construed as persons. Here I briefly digress by pursuing the method of making
familiar practices appear strange (Riles 2006). I do so by invoking my ethnographic
research in Papua New Guinea. The Yonggom people with whom I work possess a
transactional model of personhood that emphasizes the creation of persons through
exchange (Kirsch 2006). They regard participation in constructive social relations
through reciprocity as the sine qua non of humanity. In contrast, the neoliberal division
of society into givers and takers, and the negative characterization of the latter, makes
little sense in a worldview based on reciprocity, which relies on productive interactions
between givers and takers, including the obligation to reverse the flow of exchange
in the future.
Living downstream from the environmentally destructive Ok Tedi copper and gold
mine, the Yonggom came to regard the mining company, BHP Billiton, as a kind of
corporate sorcerer (Kirsch 2006). To the Yonggom, a sorcerer is someone who fails
to fulfill the social responsibilities of personhood. The Yonggom accused the mining
company of behaving like a sorcerer by denying its relationship to the people living
downstream along the polluted Ok Tedi River and Fly River. They blamed the mining
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company for a variety of accidents and injuries that in the past would have been
attributed to individual acts of sorcery. They mobilized their views on reciprocity in
their critique of corporate practices, an example of “reverse anthropology” (Kirsch
2006).
When legal action and the accompanying international approbation forced BHP
Billiton to abandon the mine in 2001, the company transferred its shares in the project
to a trust fund based in Singapore. The company’s objective was to limit its liability
for future environmental impacts from the mine. But BHP Billiton did not anticipate
that the prices of gold and copper would skyrocket after it relinquished its shares
in the project and probably would not have taken this action had it known the full
cost to its bottom line. The Yonggom and their neighbors were critical of the mining
company for leaving the country and evading its responsibilities for the damage to
their rivers and forests. They objected to the short-term horizons of contemporary
capitalism and the self-serving mobility of the corporation (Kirsch 2008:283–84; see
also Bashkow 2006). The state nationalized the Ok Tedi mine in late 2013, although
it has not succeeded in gaining control over the $1.4 billion trust fund.
Criticism of the mining company reveals a fundamental contradiction in the metaphor
of corporate personhood: corporations selectively claim the rights of natural persons
while ignoring the social responsibilities of personhood. This recognition may help
explain the disquiet so many Americans felt when Romney argued “[c]orporations are
people, my friend . . . human beings.” Corporations may possess some of the attributes
of personhood, but as the examples from Papua New Guinea suggest, corporations
relate to others through the market rather than reciprocal relations (see Fisher 2014;
Riles 2011). The metaphor of the corporate sorcerer provides the Yonggom with the
means to identify the mining company’s failure to fulfill its responsibilities to the
people living downstream.
Similarly, the contributors to this symposium consider how corporate personhood is
imagined in a variety of contexts. Peter Benson describes how corporations try to
shift the responsibility for the damage caused by tobacco and firearms to individuals
and families. There are elements of a relational model of corporate personhood in the
claim that corporations that manufacture and sell guns are composed of parents who
share the concerns of other members of society. Yet the emphasis on family sentiments
is intended to obscure recognition of the differential responsibility for harm. Benson
points out that efforts to hold families responsible for gun safety sidesteps corporate
responsibility for the casualties of shootings. Similarly, the tobacco industry seeks
to deflect criticism of smoking by emphasizing “healthy decisions” rather than its
responsibility for producing a product that is harmful to consumers. In these examples,
corporate personhood is briefly decomposed to transfer social responsibility from the
corporation to the body politic, a practice with lethal consequences.
In her article, Kedron Thomas invokes earlier anthropological discussion of cor-
porate groups, notably Eric Wolf’s characterization of Maya villages in Guatemala
as “closed, corporate peasant communities” (Thomas 2014). Wolf understood the
composition of these communities to be the historical outcome of their engagement
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with colonial society. Similar issues arise in the present in relation to the participa-
tion of these communities in competing forms of enterprise, the mass production of
branded clothing by transnational companies in large-scale, foreign-owned factories
known as maquilas and small-scale workshops producing counterfeit versions of the
same apparel. In her discussion of the clothing workshops where she conducted re-
search, Thomas identifies a key distinction that echoes Wolf’s attention to the moral
economies of Maya communities. Whereas the workers in the maquilas learn basic
skills that enable them to obtain other low-wage jobs, the people employed in the
smaller workshops gain experience that allow them to start workshops of their own.
In contrast to the temporary work provided by the mobile maquilas, whose abrupt
departures not only deprive employees of their jobs but also their back pay, the work-
shops provide steady employment. Although the maquilas and workshops produce
similar garments, the trademarked clothes produced in the maquilas receive legal
protection even when the workers do not, whereas these relationships are reversed
in the smaller workshops. Thomas describes how her informants’ identification with
brand pirates through the production and consumption of counterfeit clothing entails
a collective thumbing of their noses at the inequities of the global economy.5
Robert Foster directs our attention to new forms of “connected capitalism” in which
corporations increasingly partner with NGOs. These relationships are intended to
maximize share value, the rationale for what is sometimes called the “business case”
for corporate social responsibility. Foster argues that these relationships emerge at a
particular historical moment when corporations are increasingly challenged by their
critics (see Benson and Kirsch 2010). The resulting partnerships are often formed
with NGOs that might otherwise be critical of corporate practices. So the Coca Cola
Company, facing international criticism for competing with other users of scarce
water supplies, elects to collaborate with an environmental NGO on an initiative
promoting clean water. This might be understood as an example of “greenwashing”
through which corporations seek to enhance their reputations as a defense against
critique. But Foster points to the embodiment of the corporation in the form of the cor-
porate CEO who can establish social relationships through strategic partnerships. He
suggests that the resulting collaboration more closely resembles a patron–client rela-
tionship than a horizontal relationship between equal partners. Participation in these
relationships also furthers the transformation of NGOs into recognizable brands.6
These relationships ease the conduct of business by allowing corporations to promote
themselves as good citizens. The partnerships also support the view that markets are
able to solve social and environmental problems without regulatory intervention by
the state, even as they undemocratically exclude other publics from participation.
Dinah Rajak’s article is concerned with the mobilization of nostalgia for the corporate
past by Anglo American plc, the foremost mining company in South Africa. The
imagery of corporate personhood requires the “crafting of a fitting biography” (Rajak
2014). This takes the form of a foundational myth of a corporation that has always been
dedicated to the social good despite the countervailing narrative about its complicity
in the genesis of the apartheid state, which ensured the mining industry’s access
to an inexpensive and disciplined workforce. Anglo American even managed to
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benefit from economic sanctions against apartheid that restricted the international
flow of capital by making domestic investments that buttressed its economic influence
in South Africa. This supports a view of the corporation as a project that must
continually be renegotiated rather than as a historical accomplishment. Mythologizing
the founders of the corporation is a key strategy for promoting the corporation as a
moral self, which is integral rather than incidental to the exercise and reproduction
of corporate power. Promoting an image of Anglo American as “progressive and
patriotic” also enhances its role in postapartheid political governance.
As Paul Manning (2010) observes, branding is increasingly applied to a “new range of
experiences, services, and quasi-commodities that are not in themselves conventional
economic objects” (34). Ilana Gershon provides an example of this phenomenon in her
analysis of how job seekers conceptualize their need to establish a personal brand. The
work of individual brand management includes the production of a steady stream of
text messages, Tweets, and blog posts. This creates dual anxieties for individuals who
strive to create a coherent, recognizable, and employable self while demonstrating
the ability to meet the demands of corporate employers searching for a flexible
workforce. Gershon draws on debates in linguistic anthropology to illustrate how
these processes require job seekers to animate a visible, public identity, showing how
economic transformations affect the rhetoric of self-making. She argues that the core
metaphor of the self is undergoing a shift from “possessive individualism” in which
property is central to identity and political rights, to a more entrepreneurial model in
which one “owns oneself as though one was a business” (Gershon 2014). In short,
corporate personhood also becomes a personal status that prospective employees
struggle to achieve for themselves.
The articles in this collection creatively illustrate the productivity of the metaphor
of corporate personhood. Anthropologists have long recognized the significance of
the metaphors we live by (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), but insufficient attention has
been paid to the ways legal metaphors influence social life. The analogy between
corporations and personhood suggests new ways to address the role of corporations in
society while also serving as a resource for corporations to extend their political and
economic reach. These articles point to the ways that the figure of corporate person-
hood has been invoked to disarm critique, craft alternative moral economies, create
strategic partnerships, narrate corporate history, and reorganize the job candidate’s
sense of self. Examining how corporate personhood is imagined and mobilized also
challenges us to address pressing questions about the social and moral responsibilities
of personhood writ large.
Notes
These articles were originally presented at a session on “Imagining Corporate Per-
sonhood” at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association in
2012, which was cosponsored by the Association for Political and Legal Anthropol-
ogy and the American Ethnological Society. Peter Benson and I co-organized the
event. Previous commitments prevented Elana Shever from including her paper in
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this collection. Although she was unable to participate in the session, Kedron Thomas
generously allowed us to include her work here.
1. The doctrine of corporate personhood is generally attributed to a case against a
railroad company for its failure to pay taxes (Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 1886), although it arises from comments made by the
court reporter (see Pollman 2011:1642–1644). It is also referred to as the “natural”
or “real entity” theory of the corporation in contrast to claims that corporations
are simply associations of natural persons, partnerships between shareholders, or
the managers of collectively-held property (Ciepley 2012:4–5, n.3).
2. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo’s famous admonition that “meta-
phors in law are to be carefully watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they often end by enslaving it,” addressed the relationship between parent corpo-
rations and their subsidiaries (see Smith 2007:924–925).
3. Scholarly attention to corporate personhood seems to have supplanted research
on corporate culture prominent in organizational psychology and business man-
agement during the 1980s and 1990s.
4. In contrast to the U.S. government bailout of the banks and some corporations
during the recent recession, individuals whose houses became worth less than their
home loans generally had to declare bankruptcy, which suggests the limitations
of a relational model of personhood in a capitalist economy.
5. Even anticorporate NGOs borrow freely from the language of branding (Conley
and Williams 2005:11).
6. Brand pirates, and pirates in general, are intriguing counterparts to the figure
of the corporate person. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum (133 S. Ct. 1659 [2013]) restricted the conditions in which
transnational corporations can be held accountable for international human rights
violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which was originally intended
to bring pirates on the high seas to justice in the United States.
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